6.25 기록사진(21)

6.25 기록사진(21)
Air Strike North of Punchbowl, 1953 Run by Gus Breen while on line An Air-strike North of Punchbowl Area, Eastern Front, Korea, February 1953 Strike was 100 metres in front of 40th Infantry Division. 4th Fighter Interceptor Group - the MiG Killers. Major James Jabara, left, the world's first jet ace, shakes hands with Captain Manuel "Pete" Fernandez minutes after the Captain destroyed two MiGs over MiG Alley. Jabara ended the war with the second highest kill claim record of 15, and Fernandez was right behind with 14.5. CCF T34 dug into hilltop and camouflaged Used as support artillery very effectively when battle movement was still fluid CCF Multibarreled Rockets An eerie set of calling cards for UN recipients By 1953 China had built up her artillery support all along the line until it equalled our own in numbers. The barrages laid down to isolate and overwhelm Combat Outposts under attack near the war's close were frightful, equalling or exceeding anything in World War I CCF MiGs Pilot and crew chief talking over aircraft performance When MiGs first attacked our forces in Korea they were largely, and secretly, flown by experienced Russian pilots, and inflicted severe casualties on our unsuspecting aircraft, particularly our B29s. Gradually China built up their own pilot capabilities, but American success in air-to-air combat was much higher against them than the Russians, who fought us about equally. Although China had only 500 fighters of all kinds in July, 1951, within a year they had built up to 1500 MiG fighters, based in sanctuaries in Manchuria, which UN pilots were forbidden to attack. Enemy Air Strength at war's end By Soviet estimates, the Chinese and North Korean "Unified Air Forces" (OVA) had 892 aircraft actually available for air combat: the PRC had 480, and the KPA 412, of which total 635 were MiG-15 fighters. These were divided up into seven aviation divisions. Soviet View of North Korea's Air forces, and North Korea's capabilities generally to now. Sniper Zhang Taofang, CCF Sniper Allegedly scored 214 hits on UN troops in 32 days Firing a Mosin Nagant 7.62mm carbine, without scope, this is an improbable accreditation, but stranger things have happened. Certainly the CCF weren't noted for their sniper capabilities, but were good enough so that only the inexperienced casually wandered around where they might be under observation from unfriendly eyes. The "Underground Wall Of China" permitted snipers on forward slopes to man their positions until artillery actually began to fall, and then simply back into the tunnels behind them. This Chinese propaganda photo below makes this point. As a rule, when assaults were made on enemy positions, strategems such as time-on-target barrages fired after a period of inactivity long enough for the CCF to re-emerge from their holes tended to reduce the effectiveness of their responses. Australian Invented Napham Rockets First combat firing 77 Squadron strike, testing Australia's 'Flying onion'. Taken from American trail plane. These rockets proved very successful. Most hit the target and caused numerous fires. They later caused great damage to truck convoys and trains. Some photos of 77 Squadron Mustangs and Meteors. Never made it back home 77 Squadron P-51 Mustang Later equipped with Meteors, 77 Squadron shot down some MiGs but lost more of their less modern aircraft themselves. In the main, this Australian squadron provided ground support, very effectively, in Australia's very significant contribution to the United Nation's Korean War effort. 8-in Howitzer and Crew This 8-in How had "Persuaders" stenciled on its barrel, and was probably part of 17th FAB firing in support of BCD (British Commonwealth Division) during Operation Commando in October 1951. Whether or not this is actually the time the photo was taken is not known for sure, but here is a comment from Vince Gilligan, 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, who did not know of the existence of this photo when he wrote. White Horse Hill (Hill 395), October 1952 ROK 9th Division fights off CCF assaults, October 3-12 1952 Capt. Tom Crawford, March 1953, attacking Papa-San, Central Korea Cpt. Tom Crawford of Littleton CO USA comes in low to mark Chinese camouflaged bunkers on Papa-San. Marker rockets striking inside marked area. Pyok Tong, North Korea POW Camp Graveyard for many UN prisoners This lovely close-up is of a POW camp at Pyok Tong North Korea. The not so lovely part is that over 2000 UN prisoners are buried behind the camp. Marines make a different "Amphibious" Landing Jamestown Line, 1953 M20 3.5in Rocket Launcher In the first vertical envelopment in history, a giant HRS-1 Sikorsky helicopter lands Marines in front of the Jamestown Line. Marine Helicopters were invaluable in Marine operations and support. They provided liaison, reconnaissance, evacuation of wounded, rescue from enemy territory, "observation, messenger service, guard mail at sea, posting and supplying of outguards on dominating terrain features and resupplying of small units by air." On October 11, 1951 HMR-161 liften 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines with its equipment in Operation Bumblebee, and continued support for 1stMarDiv through the next year. onFebruary 23, 1953 HMR-161 began Operation Haylift in logistical support of combat Marines. "Over a four day period, an average of 12 HRS-1's, flew from dawn to dusk carrying a combined total of 31,589 pounds per hour. Each aircraft made 27 round trips of the 15 mile leg and carried 11 tons of supplies. It would have taken a large fleet of trucks to provide this type of support and it would have taken four times as long. Normally the Marines hiked into assaults or rode on supporting tanks as here, where the Marine carrying the SCR-300 communication set is already on top and the one with the flame thrower is just climbing on board. The five Marine infantrymen are wearing armored vests. The Last Winter, '52-'53 - 25id Bunkers In winter of '52 President-Elect Eisenhower visited the front lines near Chorwon, and then made it clear that he was only interested in ending the war with an honorable peace. At this time, about 700,000 CCF and NK troops were in the line or in reserve, facing about 350,000 UN infantry. The slaughter went on until July 27, 1953, during which time the CCF continually probed our lines to find points of weakness, and attacked wherever they thought they could improve their positions before the truce. The Communists generally spent around 5 months digging large caves and underground locations for their troops all along the line. This protected them from UNC air and artillery, as well as the weather. UNC generally relied on a bunker system. Here, as a component of IX Corps, 25id has strong bunker positions on the reverse slope somewhere in the White Horse, Triangle Hill, and Jackson Heights area, around October, 1952. 80% of bunkers like these were usually underground, and could be entered from the trenches which linked the entire front. Thick logs and sandbags, covered by a layer of loose sand, sticks and rocks gave protection from artillery and mortar hits. M20 3.5in Rocket Launcher Disassembled M-20 still on his lap, a Marine enjoys a smoke after a daylight raid Nevada Cities area, 1953 Talks Begin Kaesong, July 8, 1951 Koje-do Summary of Koje-do Riots Prisoners in a compound of the Koje-do POW camp, ca early 1952 The village in background was later evacuated and burned to prevent exchange of information between prisoners and villagers One of the points of contention which delayed signing of the Armistice was how to deal with POWs who did not wish to be repatriated. We had over 137,000 communist prisoners by January 1952, and about a third of them did not wish to be repatriated, which was a serious embarassment for the enemy. As contrast, the enemy ended up with about 13,500 prisoners from all UN forces, of whom 347 refused repatriation, including 21 Americans. To enflame this situation even further were the events that took place in the UN Command Koje-do POW camp. The Geneva Convention of 1949 on prisoners of war was designed primarily to protect prisoners, and completely failed to foresee the development of hard-core, organized prisoner groups or to provide protection for captor nations in dealing with their stubborn, armed resistance. Whatever attempts UNC made to control them reflected adversely on the UNC in the public view, further weakening our ability to control and restrain the camp compounds. With North Korean and Chinese leaders, including agents who deliberately allowed themselves to be captured in order to organize cells of resistance, the Koje-do compounds soon turned to beatings and other coercion to subjugate disillusioned anti-communist prisoners, including the murder of scores of such prisoners. Attempts to screen the prisoners to decide who wished repatriation led to several bloody riots instigated by the communist leadership, with scores of POWs being killed by UNC troops and others murdered by the communists. only about 1500 prisoners actually took part in the riots, strongly suggesting that only the hard-core leadership was primarily involved. When UNC teams did begin screening the prisoners beginning April 8 1952, they were astonished to find that only 70,000 of the 170,000 military and civilian prisoners consented to repatriation. This was the root cause for the POW capture of Koje commandant General Dodd. Photos of Koje-do POW compound 76 at this time.      One of the most humiliating events for the UNC in the Korean War took place on May 7, 1952, when camp commandant General Dodd was trapped, taken prisoner and put on trial by the communist leaders of compound 76.      Rather than forcing a military solution which would have cost the General's life as well as that of untold numbers of the prisoners, replacement commandant General Colson and the reinforced 38th Infantry Regiment sat and watched as the communists put General Dodd on trial on criminal charges for abuse of prisoners, a farce unequalled in modern military history. After winning as many concessions as they thought they could obtain, the communists finally released General Dodd, unhurt in body but doubtless in mental agony for the remainder of his life. In June, General Boatner used infantrymen supported by tanks to regain control of the Koje-do compounds, dragging communist leader Col. Lee out of the compound by the seat of his pants. 31 prisoners were killed and scores wounded, but order was finally restored. Below are some of the weapons seized in compound 76. Clark Signs Armistice, Panmunjom, July 27, 1953 After over two years of posturing and frustrations, at the price of about half the total military casualties of the Korean War, an Armistice was finally signed and the butchery stopped at last. The Armistice Building at Panmunjom