Moscow Closes Okhotsk Sea to Outsiders
In a move that both exacerbates international
conflicts in the Western Pacific and suggests how Moscow plans to proceed in the
Arctic, Russian President Vladimir Putin has closed to all outside shipping and
fishing the entire Sea of Okhotsk—some 52,000 square kilometers of water that
had been open to other countries for fishing and deep-water
exploration.
Putin took this step after Russia secured international
recognition of Moscow’s claim that the Russian continental shelf extends under
the entire seabed of that body of water under the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Putin told the Russian Security Council that
“our experts—based on scientific data—found weighty arguments that testified
about the incontestable right of Russia to this area. Consequently, the Plenum
of [the UN commission] agreed with our conclusions and formulated the
corresponding recommendations”
(ng.ru/nvoevents/2014-04-25/2_news.html).
Moscow has long been seeking
this decision, and its victory means that Russia will now be able to invoke
international law to block all other countries from fishing or engaging in any
other activities, including seabed prospecting and mining. Despite the fact that
it has attracted only minimal attention in the West—although it has been the
focus of much concern in Japan and China—this new decision is extremely
important for at least five critical reasons.
First, it closes a major
fishing area to Japan and China, depriving them of an important harvest and
forcing them to compete even more intensively elsewhere in the Western Pacific
where tensions between the two Asian powers have been growing. Indeed, those
tensions are now so great that US Secretary of State John Kerry felt compelled
to tell Japan that the United States will ensure the security of its land
territory (RT, February 7). But Kerry’s statement did not address an even more
critical issue in Japan: China’s and now Russia’s imposition of economic
exclusion zones in the oceans. To counter that, Tokyo presently feels compelled
to build a larger navy (japanfocus.org, April 28), and some in Japan may even
feel the need to develop a nuclear capacity.
Second, the expansive
Russian claim on the Sea of Okhotsk will only further embolden China to make
claims in the oil-rich South China Sea, claims that are already sparking
conflict between Beijing, on the one hand, and Tokyo and Washington, on the
other. China will certainly invoke the Okhotsk decision in order to secure its
own Law of the Sea (LOS) sanctions.
Third, Putin’s announcement that
Russia will close the Sea of Okhotsk raises the stakes over Moscow’s even more
expansive claims in the Arctic Ocean. Moscow argues much of the Arctic seabed is
part of Russia’s continental shelf, including regions hundreds of miles from the
shoreline of the Russian Federation, and thus should be recognized as a Russian
exclusion zone (RIA Novosti, April 29). Putin’s comments on Moscow’s plans for
the Sea of Okhotsk suggest that the Kremlin leader would be prepared to do just
that.
Given global warming, which is opening up the High Arctic to
transit and exploration, the near certainty that the seabed there contains
significant deposits of oil, gas and other minerals, as well as rapidly
improving technology for extracting this natural wealth, such a Russian move
would trigger new conflicts between Russia and the other Arctic powers,
potentially including the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and even
China—which sees itself as a member of that group even though it has no Arctic
coastline.
The likelihood of that was only increased by Putin’s comments
at the time of his announcement of the Okhotsk decision. He said that Russian
exploration for and exploitation of wealth below the surface of the Arctic Sea
must be “reliably defended from terrorists and other potential threats” and that
the country’s security agencies, including the Ministry of Defense and the
Federal Security Service (FSB), among others, must develop a joint program to
that end. Putin specifically called for the creation of “a single system of
basing of [Russian] submarines and surface ships” there to do the job
(kremlin.ru, April 22).
Fourth, Putin’s plans to give military content to
Russia’s claims over enormous areas of adjoining oceans not only sets the stage
for conflicts with other powers now but will require Moscow to dramatically
increase its naval ship-building effort. Given the length of time between the
design of a ship, the laying of the keel, and launch, the Sea of Okhotsk
comments are an indication of just how far-reaching Putin’s plans now are—even
more aggressive and expansionist than many analysts currently focused on Ukraine
have thought.
And fifth—and of particular importance for the US—the Sea
of Okhotsk decision calls attention to Moscow’s clever use of those
international institutions where it has advantages in some cases because the US
is not present: While more than 160 countries have signed and ratified the LOS
convention, the US has not. As a result, Washington did not have a seat at the
table on this decision and could not block or even modify it. The US is now
beginning to pay a heavy price for that.
'國際' 카테고리의 다른 글
Is this the end of Iraq? (0) | 2015.10.25 |
---|---|
용서못할 사람들이 저지른 악행 (0) | 2015.10.25 |
몽골 분단에서 한반도를 본다 (0) | 2015.10.25 |
Austerity and the End of the European Model (0) | 2015.10.24 |
Vietnam - The Terrible Tiger (0) | 2015.10.24 |