What would push the West and Russia to nuclear war?

What would push the West and Russia to nuclear war?

Nobody is sure. That is why Joe Biden is careful in sending more potent weapons to Ukraine

The Economist

Aug 2nd 2022

 

 

“FOR ME,” quipped Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s defence minister, “The word ‘impossible’ means ‘possible in the future’.” With good reason. Javelin anti-tank missiles, forbidden by America when Russia took the first chunks of Ukraine in 2014, came in a trickle from 2017 and then a flood when Russia invaded again in February. Stinger anti-aircraft weapons, similarly refused, arrived in March. And the long-awaited HIMARS rocket launchers have been taking out command posts and weapons dumps far behind Russia’s frontlines since June. F-16 fighter jets may come one day.

 

America and Europe hail Ukraine’s resolute fighting spirit, which raises a nagging question: why are they not sending more weapons, more quickly? Officials’ answers vary: the West is moving with unprecedented speed; it is giving priority to weapons that are most urgently needed; it has to train Ukrainians to use and maintain their new kit; and they have to show they can use it effectively in battle.

 

The strongest reason for America’s caution, though, is the fear of escalation—that Russia might lash out militarily at NATO (“horizontal escalation”, in the jargon) or resort to chemical or nuclear weapons in Ukraine (“vertical escalation”).

Either version would almost certainly draw NATO into direct conflict with Russia, and President Joe Biden has vowed to avoid “World War III”.

 

Ukraine’s counter-attack to reconquer Kherson, now getting under way, presents a test. If successful, hawks will see it as proof that Ukraine, given the right help, can win the war. Doves will fret that it could provoke Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, into an overreaction.

 

On the day he invaded Ukraine Mr Putin threatened outsiders thinking of intervening with immediate consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history”. State media in Russia fantasise luridly about nuclear strikes on the West.

 

For now, though, America says there is no sign that Russia has put its nuclear forces on higher alert. America and Russia still swap information about their long-range nukes. On August 1st Mr Biden called on Russia to resume arms-control talks.

 

Over five months of fighting, the threshold for a direct clash has repeatedly shifted, seemingly without dire consequences for the West. “NATO has been brilliant at salami-slicing its assistance,” says James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank in Washington. “It has given the Ukrainians a fair amount of support, but at no time did it present Russia with a point at which they could say, ‘No further’.”

 

Not all agree. “Every salami-slice means that more innocent Ukrainians are killed,” retorts Ben Hodges, a former head of American forces in Europe. He says the Biden administration “has overstated the risk of escalation.” The Kremlin, he argues, is already doing its worst, in terms of atrocities and of military effort, and its navy and air force are “terrified” of the Ukrainians. Russia does not want to take on NATO, says the ex-general, and a nuclear response is highly unlikely.

 

Others caution that Russia may escalate rather than accept defeat. Samuel Charap, of the RAND Corporation, a think-tank closely tied to the Pentagon, says Russia has unused military capacity, especially if it initiates a mobilisation. The air force could also be committed more fully. The more the West helps Ukraine, the more Russia will raise the stakes. “There is no stable equilibrium,” argues Mr Charap. “We are in a slow-moving, incremental escalation.”

 

Cold-war history suggests that countries can go a long way in waging proxy wars against nuclear powers without atomic retribution (albeit with scares). Think of Russia and China supporting North Vietnam against America in the 1970s; or America arming the Afghan mujahideen to bleed the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

 

Russia’s published doctrine envisages four scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons: detection of a ballistic-missile attack against Russia or its allies; an attack on them with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction; actions that threaten its nuclear command-and-control systems; and “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”.

 

On the face of it, the West’s arming of Ukraine falls well short of any of those red lines. Yet the concept of an existential threat is elastic, notes Bruno Tertrais of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think-tank in France. Mr Putin has described Ukraine as “a matter of life and death”. He has also suggested that any attack on Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, would be similarly grave (and if Russia formally annexes more Ukrainian territory, trying to retake it may become more dangerous). Others ask, what if Mr Putin regards himself as the state, so that any danger to his regime is deemed an existential threat to Russia?

 

A recent RAND paper by Mr Charap and others sets out four scenarios of horizontal escalation. The first is labelled “Pathway 0” because the escalation spiral may already be under way: Russia is bound to respond to heavy military and economic losses inflicted on it, if not now then “in due course”. Next is a pre-emptive attack by Russia if it thinks NATO is about to intervene directly, after it deploys missile systems near the Russian border, say. Third is hitting military supply lines that support Ukraine. Last is “a dramatic increase in domestic, economic, and political instability in Russia”.

 

In most cases Russia’s retribution would probably begin covertly—eg, through cyberattacks, sabotage, assassination and more. The pre-emption scenario is most likely to provoke a military attack, perhaps even a nuclear strike. The scenarios may overlap and “all are more dangerous if Russia is losing”, Mr Charap adds.

 

In truth, nobody knows where Mr Putin’s red lines lie. Perhaps not even he does. America has stopped talking of helping Ukraine “win” and of weakening Russia. Instead it speaks of ensuring Ukraine does not lose. In an op-ed for the New York Times in May Mr Biden listed many things America would not do. It would not seek to unseat Mr Putin. It would not send troops to Ukraine or fight against Russia. It would not encourage or enable Ukraine to strike at Russia. Nor would it “prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia”.

 

Mr Biden warned Russia that using nuclear weapons “would entail severe consequences”. A response would depend on the circumstances, but officials whisper it may involve conventional rather than nuclear strikes. Plainly, Mr Biden does not want to get to that point.

While steering around these self-imposed limits, Mr Biden has left his destination undeclared. Informed sources say senior officials are conducting wargames to decide on their ultimate objective. For now the administration speaks in bromides, saying it wants “a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine”. It does not adopt Ukraine’s demand for the return of all lost territories, including land Russia took in 2014. Intentionally or not, Mr Biden’s policy is likely to generate a long war or a grinding stalemate. That risks cracking the unity and staying power of Western countries if voters revolt against stagflation, energy scarcity and the bill for supporting Ukraine. That may, of course, be Mr Putin’s plan.

 

Yet frustration and uncertainty is in the nature of nuclear dissuasion: America is deterred from intervening directly; Russia from striking at NATO. The late Tom Schelling, an economist and nuclear strategist, argued that the brink of war can be unknowable: it is not “the sharp edge of a cliff where one can stand firmly, look down, and decide whether or not to plunge”; instead it is a slippery curved slope where “neither the person standing there nor the onlookers can be quite sure quite how great the risk is”. When the peril is a catastrophic nuclear exchange, who can blame leaders for treading carefully? ■

 

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine crisis.