North Korea is preparing for another nuclear test—or many

 

North Korea is preparing for another nuclear test—or many

Kim Jong Un is trying to diversify his array of threats

 

The Economist, Oct 18th 2022 | SEOUL

 

 

NORTH KOREANS looking skywards on October 8th would have seen some 150 fighter jets thundering overhead, and perhaps for a moment feared the worst. But they are more likely to have shrugged it off as yet another demonstration of their country’s military prowess, returning to the more pressing matter of finding enough food to keep their families alive.

 

Such is the frequency with which North Korea has held drills and tests this year (see chart) that shows of strength have become routine. It kicked off the year with an unprecedented number of launches. These included both tests of “hypersonic” missiles designed to evade detection and its first intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) tests since 2017.

 

The momentum has continued throughout the year. In the past month it has launched more than a dozen missiles and fired artillery into an area where both Koreas agreed not to conduct military exercises. On September 25th it launched a missile from a platform submerged under a lake, later claiming that it is developing underwater launch silos. And on October 4th it tested another IRBM, which flew over Japan and covered more than 4,500km, the farthest a North Korean missile has been known to go.

 

At the start of the year generals were testing new technology. But the tests of the past month are different. They had some novel elements, but mostly they have involved weapons already known to work. This suggests North Korea is evaluating its combat-readiness, says Jenny Town of the Stimson Centre, a think-tank in Washington.

 

The North says it is merely doing the same as South Korea and America, which held their first full-scale joint exercises in five years over the summer. But a report on October 10th in Rodong Sinmun, North Korea’s paper of record, offered a better explanation. Not only was Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s dictator, present at the latest tests, giving them a higher profile than the earlier technical trials, but, it said, their purpose was to simulate the use in warlike scenarios of tactical nuclear weapons, referring to low-yield warheads suitable for battlefield use rather than annihilating entire cities.

 

South Korean spooks believe the North is preparing for a nuclear test—its seventh—which could come within the next few weeks, perhaps before America’s midterm elections on November 8th. South Korea’s deputy defence minister suggested that there might be multiple tests.

 

When Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s dictator, in January 2021 made a speech to a party meeting including a military wishlist for scientists and soldiers, tactical nuclear weapons were at the top. After nuclear warheads and the ICBMs necessary to deliver them to the American mainland, tactical weapons represent the next stage in North Korea’s nuclear deterrent, which Mr Kim sees as his insurance policy against foreign interference. An arsenal of smaller weapons would help to counter the threat posed by South Korea’s armed forces.

 

That is a significant sharpening of what Mr Kim calls his “treasured sword” of nuclear weapons. By showing off a range of delivery methods, a variety of test locations, and advances in smaller warheads, he is signalling that his nuclear programme is so diverse and well-developed that his enemies cannot be sure to eliminate it with pre-emptive action. Only one nuclear weapon would have to survive to give him the potential to cause unthinkable damage. In September Mr Kim made clear that a nuclear strike could be triggered “automatically” under certain conditions, including his own assassination. Any move against him, he signalled, would be disastrous for everyone.

 

America and South Korea’s response has been to talk up their “ironclad” alliance and threaten annihilation if the North tried any funny business. On October 5th America briefly deployed an aircraft-carrier to the waters east of the peninsula. South Korea test-fired missiles of its own, scrambled jets and fired artillery in like-for-like drills. Both countries imposed new unilateral sanctions on North Korean individuals and organisations accused of aiding North Korean weapons development.

 

Accompanying the displays of economic, rhetorical and literal firepower was the standard offer of talks. This month America restated its willingness to to sit down “without pre-conditions” and expressed a desire for a “transition from an era of provocation to an era of pragmatic engagement”.

 

Yet sticking to a dog-eared playbook that has failed for decades is a questionable strategy. America and South Korea have sufficiently robust defence capabilities to repel an attack, says Jo Bee-yun of the Korea Institute for Defence Analyses, a think-tank in Seoul. But it is not clear that the allies are credibly communicating that “nuclear coercion or nuclear blackmail will not succeed”, she says. They must adapt to the new threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons, she adds.

 

Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea’s president, has also stuck to his old line, arguing that North Korea has “nothing to gain from nuclear weapons”. Yet it is clear that Mr Kim does not see things that way. Nuclear weapons bolster his security, give him more leverage and help him build up the stock of chips he could bargain away for concessions. If talks were indeed to happen, the later the better for Mr Kim, so he can continue to work on his weapons.

 

Moreover, America’s offer of unconditional talks comes with one big condition: that the eventual aim of negotiations be denuclearisation. Mr Kim has been very clear that the country’s nuclear status is “irreversible”, even going so far as to codify this long-standing policy in law in September.As long as America demands that he give up his nukes, he has no interest in talking about anything.

 

North Korean weapons tests are “especially concerning because we don’t have a plan for how to de-escalate,” says Ms Town. The longer America and South Korea content themselves with ineffective bluster, the stronger North Korea gets. That will only make Mr Kim more confident he can resist more pressure—and heighten the risk of miscalculation.■