Statement by General
Marshall, January 7, 1947
In this intricate and confused
situation, I shall merely endeavor here to touch on some of the more important
considerations-as they appeared to me -during my connection with the
negotiations to bring about peace in China and a stable democratic form of
government.
In the first place, the greatest
obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with
which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each
other.
On the one hand, the leaders of the
Government are strongly opposed to a communistic form of government. on the
other, the Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work
toward establishing a communistic form of government in China, though first
advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American
or British type. . . .
I think the most important factors
involved in the recent break-down of negotiations are these: on the side of the
National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang, there is a dominant
group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every
effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government.
. . . This group includes military as well as political leaders.
On the side of the Chinese
Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this
view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party
discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint.
Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among
the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in
disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments-men who would put the
interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist
ideology in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not
hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end . . . They completely
distrust the leaders of the Kuomintang and appear convinced that every
Government proposal is designed to crush the Chinese Communist Party. I must say
that the quite evidently inspired mob actions of last February and March, some
within a few blocks of where I was then engaged in completing negotiations, gave
the Communists good excuse for such suspicions. . . .
Sincere efforts to achieve
settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both
sides. The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year
ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis
for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the
Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China,
evidently had no real intention of implementing them. . . .
Between this dominant reactionary
group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists who, I must state, did
not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to
be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people
of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on
substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by
their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest arc evidently
counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government,
accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail
communications-regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese
people.
The salvation of the situation, as
I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the
Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet
lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action
on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I
believe, lead to unity through good government. . . .
I have spoken very. frankly because
in no other way can I hope to bring the people of the United States to even a
partial understanding of this complex problem. I have expressed all these views
privately in the course of negotiations; they are well known, I think, to most
of the individuals concerned. I express them now publicly, as it is my duty, to
present my estimate of the situation and its possibilities to the American
people who have a deep interest in the development of conditions in the Far East
promising an enduring peace In the Pacific.