On December 26, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine located in Chiyoda, Tokyo. Abe’s trip marked the first time in seven years that a Japanese Prime Minister traveled to the shrine, and the visit was met with harsh criticism by both the U.S. government as well as leaders of Japan’s neighboring countries. Founded by Emperor Meiji in 1869, the Yasukuni Shrine commemorates Japanese soldiers who died in service of their country from the 1868 Boshin War through World War II. Yet, the shrine also serves as the resting place for several convicted Japanese war criminals from World War II, and the memorial has been interpreted by China and the Korean Peninsula as a controversial and even repugnant sign of Japanese imperialism and aggression. After Abe’s actions attracted international ire, the motives behind the Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine should be called into question.
In recent years, a nationalist fervor has swept through Japanese society. Approximately one year prior to Abe’s visit, the Japanese government purchased the rights to three of the five oil-rich Senkaku Islands from the Kurihara family, a move disputed by China. The Japanese government also approved the country’s first-ever national security strategy in December 2013, initiating a five-year military build-up plan. However, despite its status as one of the power players in East Asia, Japan continues to lack a critical symbol of authority: nuclear weapons. As China’s economic capacity and political influence progressively expand, and as North Korea continues to conduct missile tests and develop an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal, is a reassessment of dormant Japanese nuclear capabilities a next step for Japan? While Japanese official policies have steadfastly renounced nuclear weapons, Abe’s demeanor, combined with a surging nationalist sentiment, could ultimately pave the way to a nuclearized Japan.
Japan, once victim of the devastating effects of a nuclear bomb, retains a distinctive approach towards nuclear weapons dictated by the country’s post-World War II commitment to pacifism. Included within Japan’s 1947 Constitution is Article 9, which renounces the country’s right to war, prohibits Japan from maintaining military, army, or navy forces, and essentially ensures a staunch Japanese anti-nuclear stance. Japan’s defensive strategy against the threat of nuclear weapons has revolved around U.S. extended deterrence since the 1950s.
Beyond its vow of nonaggression, Japan’s nuclear weapons policy is comprised of three main pillars. In 1955, the Japanese government adopted the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which restricts the use of Japan’s nuclear material to peaceful means. Then in 1968, the Japanese parliament, known as the National Diet, passed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles that delineate Japan’s pledge to refrain from possessing nuclear weapons, manufacturing them, or permitting their entry onto Japanese soil. Japan is also a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, evidencing the country’s devotion to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
On the one hand, news headlines suggest that Japan remains dedicated to its longstanding, anti-nuclear weapons platform. The 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors provided a reminder of the dangers posed by nuclear technology. In November 2013, a Japan-led United Nations statement that calls for global nuclear disarmament received a record 102 co-sponsors and passed by a majority of 169 to 1. Japan had refused to support prior UN statements on this topic due to incompatibilities with its reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for security. This past November, however, Japan helped draft a revised UN statement, which enabled it to support gradual disarmament worldwide and simultaneously safeguard its position vis-à-vis the U.S.
Nevertheless, it is no secret that Prime Minister Abe promotes a strong nationalist agenda as demonstrated by his political rhetoric and economic tactics. Under Abe’s leadership, the initiation of Japanese nuclear mobilization, both internationally and domestically, has emerged as a looming concern. In the last few months, Abe agreed to export nuclear power plant technologies to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and potentially to India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil as well. Although the agreements are part of Japan’s new economic growth strategy and still await approval from the Japanese Diet, the potential installation of nuclear power plants has sparked widespread anxiety, as the projects could accelerate weapons proliferation around the world via the transformation of commercial nuclear material into weapons-grade uranium. Some have placed these pacts in the context of Abe’s grand strategy - as an opportunity for a more aggressive Japan to extend its influence in the shadow of a rising China and a dangerous North Korea.
Furthermore, escalating tensions in East Asia have prompted the international community to apprehensively scrutinize Japan’s nuclear direction. Experts claim that Japan owns the technology and materials necessary to produce a nuclear bomb within six months, and Japanese representatives have stated that a new plutonium-producing nuclear reactor is set to open this October in Rokkasho. Additionally, China has demanded that Japan justify its extensive nuclear stockpile and is growing wary of Japanese ambitions, especially in the context of unstable regional dynamics. Japan has also proven reluctant to part with more than 300 kg of weapons-grade plutonium that it received from the United States for research during the 1960s, despite calls from the Obama administration for the return of the reserve.
Thus, as China and North Korea continue to flex their muscles, perhaps Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine should be understood as just another small symbol of Japanese authority. Alternatively, when linked together, Abe’s maneuvers may serve as manifestations of his underlying desire to amend Article 9, abandon Japan’s doctrine of demilitarization, and spawn a nuclearized Japan.
Bennett Seftel is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues. The views expressed above are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Strategic and International Studies or the Project on Nuclear Issues