맥아더 장군 미 의회 증언록

맥아더 장군 미 의회 증언록    2012/02/22 11:59
일자: 1951년 5월3일-5일　 장소: 미 상원 군사.외교 합동위원회 자료제공: 산께이신문 세이론지 ADVISABILITY OF CROSSING THE THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL 　Senator Morse. 　At any time were you asked for a recommendation, or advice, by your superiors in line of command, as to whether or not we should push beyond the 38th parallel, and go all the way to the Yalu? 　General MacArthur. 　The original mission that was assigned was to clear all of Korea. 　That original declaration of policy was supplemented, in October, by the United Nations General Assembly. 　The actual crossing of the 38th parallel was specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense, to me, in a message, a personal message, which said that he did not, － the Defense Department did not wish to in any way embarrass me tactically or strategically in my crossing of the 38th parallel. 　The halt that took place after the Inchon landing, which was something magnificently spear-headed by the Marines, － the halt in crossing the parallel was due entirely to logistical difficulties. It was with the greatest difficulty that troops could be supplied. 　We had to go through the Seoul, --- had to go from Inchon to Seoul, or by railroad from Pusan up, and, General Walker had the greatest difficulty in getting a sufficient depot of supplies to push the attack north of the Seoul area. 　The crossing of the 38th parallel was not only in complete accord with every directive I received, but all the details of the crossing were daily reported. 　As far as I know, it had the most complete and absolute approval of every section of the American Government and, as far as I knew, of every section of the United Nations. 　I have seen since reports that the British advanced some idea to the contrary. If they did, it never reached me and I had a liaison officer, an Air vice Marshall, assigned as the special liaison officer from the British Government to me, who communicated with them daily; and I saw him at frequent intervals and nothing of the sort was ever communicated. 　 　As far as I know, the crossing of that parallel had the most complete agreement by everybody that was concerned with it, except the enemy. SCOPE OF THEATER COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY 　Senator Morse. 　For purposes of emphasis in the record, General, you want this Committee to understand that in keeping with the original directive as to your responsibility to clear Korea of the invading Communists, you were given full and complete authorization by your superior command to follow those tactical actions in the field that in your judgment was necessary to carry out that directive subject to the inhibitions you have already testified to. 　General MacArthur.　 Not only that, but if I had not crossed the 38th parallel, I would have regarded myself in complete defiance of the orders I had received. 　Senator Morse.　That is what I wanted to get in the record. 　Senator Smith.　If I had believed I could not successfully cross the parallel and carry out the mission that had been assigned to me, I would have reported back that fact and asked for some change, but I felt I could successfully destroy the North Korean Army; and if there hadn't been the intervention by the Chinese Communists, I am quite certain we would have liberated, pacified, and unified all Korea. 　Senator Morse.　Now, another subject matter, General. You have commented on it in part, but I think here is the place to pin it down in the record. 　　COORDINATION BETWEEN EIGHTH ARMY AND TENTH CORPS 　Senator Morse.　It is alleged in some writings that we have read that at the time of the operation last November and December General Walker of the Eighth Army and General Almond of the Tenth Corps did not maintain communications between each other, but had to communicate through Tokyo, and orders were sent out to them from Tokyo in regard to the tactical operations that they were or should carry out in that operation. 　Is that true or false? 　　General MacArthur.　That is false. The coordination of these two forces was in my hands. The Tenth Corps was an enveloping movement that was moving it to outflank the supply line of the remnants of the North Korean Army. But the liaison between the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps was carried on by the normal processes and means, not only by planes, couriers, but by other means. 　Senator Morse.　By that you mean ----- 　General MacArthur.　There was as complete coordination as I have ever known between enveloping movements － much more coordination was there than I was able to get between the Pusan beachhead, the Eighth Army, and the Tenth Corps when I put the Tenth Corps in at Inchon. 　Senator Morse.　My next question is surplus, General, except for emphasis purposes. It is true then that during the operation engaged in by the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps there was direct communication between General Walker and General Almond, as well as with you as the overall commanding officer? 　 　General MacAarthur.　Of course. Both of those officers would coordinate along many lines. Senator Morse.　And there is no basis of fact what I think is the unfortunate allegation, if it is not in accordance with fact － and I am satisfied from the testimony it could not be in accordance with the fact － there is no basis in fact then for the charge that General Walker and General Almond were not on speaking terms, as some of the articles said? 　General MacArthur.　Ridiculous. 　Senator Morse.　I am glad to have that. 　General MacArthur.　And the officers were good friends. General Almond had been my chief of staff; General Walker commanded the Eighth Army for several years right out there. And their acquaintanceship lasted over, oh, 25 years. 　Senator Morse.　Now, General, a question or two on the exhibit in the record － 　General MacArthur.　The last time I saw Walker alive I recall that he spoke of a fine letter that he had just written General Almond. When we withdrew the Tenth Corps from that enveloping movement caused by the entrance of Red China into the war, I moved the Tenth Corps around to Pusan and placed them as a component part of the Eighth Army; and General Walker expressed to me the great pleasure that he had that he was getting Almond under his immediate command, and of the fine letter that he had just sent him. 　Senator Morse.　Now, General, I would like to ask a question or two in regard ----- 　General MacArthur.　All that sort of stuff, Senator, is “scuttlebutt,” written 10,000 miles away from the scene by these skillful propagandists who were trying to destroy the confidence of the American people in their own institutions. Nothing is viler than the effort that was made to destroy the belief by the American people that their troops were not of the highest quality and did not have adequate and efficient leadership. 　Senator Morse.　Well, General, I want to say that I think you are performing a great service in talking the opportunity of this hearing to answer those charges, and I hope you will give me credit for the sincere feeling on my part that I am performing a little service in putting the questions to you so you can answer them. 　JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF JANUARY 12, 1951, RECOMMENDATIONS 　Senator Morse.　Now, General, I want to ask a question or two in regard to the exhibit in this record, which I think is of most vital importance, namely, the so-called study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 12, with regard to which you testified so frequently in the hearings. And I ask you this question: Was the study and recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon a plan for evacuation and/or retreat to the Pusan beachhead, and that it was not contemplated that their recommendations should be implemented except in case of evacuation or retreat to Pusan? 　General MacArthur.　That is not the way it read. It said distinctly that these things should be put into operation as soon as our position in Korea was stabilized, or that we evacuated Korea. 　 　The first of the contingencies was the one of stabilization, and then, at that time, it was quite apparent that we were under normal conditions going to stabilize that situation. I would like to read the exact wording of that. 　Senetor Morse.　I will be glad to have you. 　General MacArthur.　 The pertinent phrase is this:"Prepare now to impose" -- 　 Senetor Morse.　General, may I interrupt just a moment to address a question to the Chairman? 　　PROTECTION OF CODE 　Senator Morse.　We are dealing again, I think, Mr. Chairman, with a document which I understand -- and you clear me up -- which I understand is considered one that has not been paraphrased, and that therefore the colloquy now taking place, the examination now taking place between the General and myself, it ought to be understood, will be deleted from the record when released to the public. Am I right or wrong? 　General MacArthur.　 May I intervene, Mr. Chairman? 　Chairman Russell.　Yes. 　General MacArthur.　 This does not need to be paraphrased. This is a mimeographed copy of a study which was sent to me through the mails. 　Senetor Morse.　Fine. I just wanted to get that cleared. 　General MacArthur.　 There is nothing cryptographic involved in it. 　Senetor Morse.　You may proceed. 　General MacArthur.　 The only question would be on the basis of what is there. There is no cryptographic involved in this. 　You may rest assured if there had been, I would not have introduced it. 　Senator Smith.　I may say this statement that the General is reading appeared in David Lawrence's column in the New York Herald Tribune on May 3. 　General MacArthur.　 It is in my own testimony, I think, that was given to the public. 　Chairman Russell.　I am quite sure of that. I do not think this particular message was ever in crypt. If it has been of course, the representatives of the Defense Department will see it is eliminated. 　As I recall, I think it is the third time it has been read. I said that I thought it had already been probably cleared once or twice -- 　General MacArthur.　 It has. 　Chairman Russell.　And this is the third time it has been read. 　Senetor Morse.　I think it is important to read it again, General. 　General MacArthur.　 As a matter of minor importance, Mr. Chairman, I think it is the fourth time. 　Chairman Russell.　Perhaps, your recollection is better than mine. 　General MacArthur(reading). 引 用 　"Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea." 引 用 　Senetor Morse.　General MacArthur, did General Collins at any time in a conversion with you in Japan or elsewhere advise you that it was the plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to put those recommendations into effect only in case of a program for evacuation or a retreat to the Pusan Beachhead? 　 　General MacArthur.　 No, sir. SCOPE OF SOVIET-CHINESE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1950 　Senetor Morse.　Now, General, I want to ask a line of questions -- I hope not too repetitious -- dealing with another phase of this controversy connected with the Russian-Chinese Communist pact for mutual defense, because, before I get through with the examination, you will see that what I am trying to do is to lay a skeleton outline here of what I understand, rightly or wrongly, to be the position of those who do not agree that we should follow the course of action that you recommend in Asia. 　My first question is this: Would it not appear from the terms of the Russian-Chinese alliance of 1950 that bombing in China would be the line beyond which the USSR could not remain passive under that alliance? 　General MacArthur.　Well, that I couldn't tell you, Senator. 　Senetor Morse.　Would you expect the Russian Communists---- I mean the Chinese Communist leaders, in case your program was carried out, to call upon the Soviet Union to come to their assistance under this alliance? 　General MacArthur.　That, again, I wouldn't speculate upon. There are many things that they might do. They might call upon the Soviet for air assistance; they might call for other types of supplies that would enable them to meet the conditions. Whether they would wish to have the Soviet troops and forces injected into the very heart of China, I don't know, sir. There are many possibilities as to the shade of help that they might desire, and the risks that they would themselves run if they placed themselves completely within the military dominion and power of the Soviet. 　It is quite possible that they would regard that with a degree of fear and dismay which would tend to prevent them from considering it seriously. 　The Russian already is now in certain sections, as you know, at Port Arthur and Dairen, and I myself have the belief that the Red Chinese are anxious indeed to get the Russians out of Port Arthur and Dairen, and that they would voluntarily invite the Soviet to move into their interior areas, to my mind, would be quite doubtful from a logical standpoint. 　Now my recollection of the Chinese-Soviet Agreement of mutual help was largely predicated and based in the actual wording of the document upon a threat from Japan. 　The primary reading of that treaty was as I recall based upon the assumption that Japan might again become a militaly and inperialist power, and that the other refrences were to such countried as might be in support of those inperialistic designs. 　Senator Morse.　Of Japan. 　General MacArthur.　But that the nation which was mentioned in that treaty as the primary one in which it was intended to work against was Japan. 　I may be subject to correction in that, Snator, but that is my recollection. 　Senator Morse.　Therefore generally you do not think that the language of the mutual aid treaty between Red China and Red Russia is broad enough to encompass a right to expect assistance by Red China from Red Russia in case Red China was attacked by any other country than Japan? General MacArthur.　I think that the terms of the treaty as far as I recall them were so elasticthat it was subject to interpretation along those lines. 　Senetor Morse.　Do you know of any other secret protocols or treatied between Red China and Red Russia which Red China might feel justified in invoking in case of any air attack upon her by the United Nations? 　General MacArthur.　I do not. 　RECENT CHINESE-SOVIET AGREEMENT on ASSISTANCE 　Senetor Morse.　Have you been informed as to any agreement that may have been reached by the Chinese Communist leaders and the Russians that met in recent weeks in regard to which you might be able to advise this Committee? There has been recent meeting, as you know. 　General MacArthur.　There has been I recall certain intelligence reports which advance the concept that an Agreement had been reached to supply certain materials of war by the Soviet to China. I have forgotten the figures. They were not too small. For that area I recall that it struck me they were rather large as I visualize the capacity of the Soviet to supply them, but ther dealt entirely, the report did, with what was promised in the way of supplies. 　I remember the report because I commented on it and disucussed it with my Chief of Staff, that for allies it seemed to me that was pretty weak support if China was becoming hard pressed. 　Senator Morse.　It seems to have carried out the Russian pattern of at least letting the satellites exhaust themselves first. 　IMPORTANCE OF RED CHINA TO SOVIET RUSSIA 　Senator Morse.　General, there is one line of argument in this country that is to this effect: That irrespective of a treaty of mutual aid, Russia couldn't stand by and permit China to be attacked in view of the importance of independent Red China to Red Russia's security. What comment would you make on that argument ? 　 　General MacArthur.　I don't believe that the Soviet has sufficiently associated itself with the war in Korea to believe that the defeat of Red China to the ectent of her being forced to evacuate Korea would necessarily produce great prejudice to the Soviet cause in other parts of the world. 　It has been quite apparent to me, Senator, that the linking of the Soviet to this Korean War has paled out as the events have progressed. 　SCOPE OF SOVIET ROLE IN KOREAN CONFLICT 　General MacArthur.　When this was first started, there wasn't any special thought of Red China intervening. The entire ghought of the world and anxiety of the world was that the Soviet might intervene, but as time has progressed, the conjunction of the Soviet to this campaign has receded rather than increased. At that time we were all looking for a big Russian mission there. We were looking for various Soviet indications of engaging in the combat. 　On the contrary, the Soviet even when we acidentally bombed one of here fields and admitted it and apologized and disciplined the offiecers involved and offered the Soviet compensation, they didn't even take the trouble as far as I know to collect any compensation. They dropped the issue. 　We have gone close to their border there without, as far as I can ascertain, or my intelligence, the slightest increase of their troops on the sector between North Korea and Siberia. 　I have seen no indication of the Soviet's desire to identify themselves increasingly with this Korean campaign. They have at Lake Success and the chancellories of the world, they have been the spokesmen, but out on the battlefront it has been quite the contrary. 　Senator Morse.　You have pretty much answered the next question. 　IDENTITY OF SOVIET AND RED CHINA INTERESTS 　General MacArthur.　There is another point that might be brought up. Is is just what would be the Soviet attitude, just what would be beneficial to the Soviet from their point of view, in the increasing strength of this new Frankenstein that is being gradually congealed and coalesced in China? 　Would the Soviet desire to have China become so powerful that it might even challenge the Soviet? Would it be the desire, would it be possible for the Soviet to retain a maximumdegree of control if China became too powerful? 　The general relationship between China and the Soviet has never been clearly defined. Nobody knows it except those that are intimately connected therewith, either from China or the Soviet. 　But by the logic of general strategy of the general international philosophy of the forces of the world, there is a point that might well be reached where the interests of Red China and the interests of the Red Soviet did not run parallel, that they started to traverse and become antagonistic. 　 　That is a factor which I am sure would be taken into consideration by both of those countries in an endeavor to apply for their own benefit any of these very elastic provisions that are written into this so-called treaty of alliance between them. 　Senator Morse.　One of the arguments you hear in this country is that we should play for just such a split between Russia and China as is implied, I think, in your last few comments, and not follow a course of action within China that might cause a cementing of Red China and Red Russia together and that, therefore, we should try to avoid if it is possible to win in Korea without it, we should try to avoid bombing in Manchuria which might bring in Russia. 　 SOVIET SENSITIVITY ABOUT MANCHURIA 　Senator Morse.　That goes to my next question, which is : Isn't it true that Russia now for some long period of time has been exceedingly sensitive about Manchuria, and that an attack upon Manchuria might cause her to make use of, or respond to a call to provide assistance to Red China under, the alliance? The argument, as you know, is how would we feel if some foreign country started to bomb in Mexico? I have my idea as to the source of that kind of argument, but let's get it in the records, that is part of the arguments, that Manchuria to Russia stands pretty much in the relationship of Mexico to the United States, and that she is very sensitive about who controls Manchuria. 　General MacArthur.　To answer the first part of your query, Senator, I don't think thers is any question that our own interest would be enhenced by splitting the relationship as wide as possible between China and the Soviet. The great question is the mechanics of it, how to bring it about. 　I think that everyone will agree when a man and his wife have a quarrel, if you attempt to interfere, the results are quite doubtful. 　I do not see how our interference with it would do more than complicate ito and might actually react upon ourselves. 　The great factors involved are quite beyond our control, I think, along that line. 　Now, as to the sensitivity of the Soviet to Manchuria, history shows how complete it is, but I don't think--if there is any one question that all Chinese--whether they are Red or Nationalist--would agree upon, it is that Manchuria is going to stay Chinese. 　I do not believe that any bombing effort we might make in Manchuria would alter the fact that Russia knows just as well as we know that we haven't got an iota fo imperialistic design against Manchuria or any other part of Chinz,that it would merely be in an effort to make the Red Chinese withdraw their predatory attacks in North Korea. 　Senator Morse. 　General, if we issued the ultimatum that you recommend and Red China didn't respond by stopping its aggression in North Korea, it is my understanding that the resulting bombing might include a bombing of the limited railroad facilities in Manchuria. Am I correct about that ? 　General MacArthur.　It would unquestionably involve the interdiction of such supply and logistic lines of support as are utilized in maintaining the Red troops in North Korea. 　SOVIET DEPENDENCE on MANCHURIAN RAILROADS AND RESULTS OF BOMBING SAME 　Senator Morse. 　It is my understanding that the major trunk lines in Manchuria are jointly administered by Russia and Red China, because those railroad lines also are of such vital transportation service to Russia. 　With that Russian interest in those railroad lines,might that enhance, in your opinion, the danger of Russian partici-pation in the war? 　General MacArthur.　I believe it is avery minor question when it is related to the great problem of whether a third world war is about to be launched. 　Senator Morse.　I think the record is parfectly clear as to your point on that, so I am going to hastily go over those questions, and refer briefly to your previous answars to them. 　 　In view, General, of the technioal importance of the trunk line through Manchuria to Vladivostok, the man Soviet base in the Far East, would not the Soviet Union probably consider an attack on this line athreat to its basic interest in the Far East and, therefore increase the danger of war with Red China, because without that trunk line, Vladivostok would be in a rather preoarious position? General MacArthur.　My own opinion is in the negative, Senator. 　Senator Morse.　In view, General, of the dependence of the Soviet base at Port Arthur on the rail line south from Mukden for over-length support, could not the Soviet Union probably consider disruption of this rail line a threat to its position in Port Arthur and thereby increase the danger of war? 　General MacArthur.　In my opinion, it is a minor point. 　Senator Morse.　Is it your opinion, however, that if we carried out your recommendation or the issuance of the type of ultimatum you previously testified to, to be followed by bombing if they did not desist in their aggression in North Korea, it would be necessary to bomb these trunk lines that are of such transportation importance to Vladivostok and to Mukden and to access into Russia proper ? 　General MacArthur.　It is quite possible that it would be necessary, Senator; but the probabilities are that the main use of those lines now is to transport stuff from the Soviet to China rather than the reverse, so that the interest of the Soviet would not be too violently interrupted. Senator Morse. 　 only to the extent of the Soviet world wide plan, at least, I think it is, of using other Reds to do her fighting for her, if she can, and those other Reds to do her fighting for her, if she can, and those trunk lines are of vital importance to get the material to the Red Chinese so that they can do the dying rather than the Russians. 　In that sense, it might very well create serious complications. But, as you say, it is up to her to determine. 　General MacArthur.　The treaty, as I understand it, of peace between China and the Soviet, provided that at a certain period of time, Port Arthur, Dairen and all those lines which are within China proper, pass entirely over to China. 　It is already provided in writing in that treaty, as I recall it, that those things will revert to China. 　Senator Morse.　I do not state it as a fact, General, and it will have to be determined --- one can very easily be determined --- but it is my understanding, that that treaty is not so broad as to relieve Russia from all rights in joint administration of those lines. 　I think the treaty--I say I do not swear to it, but I think the treaty--retained in Russia a considerable amount of administrative authority jointly with Red China over the transportation facilities, because of Port Aurther and Vladivostok.