"Obama has solved the problem."
If only it were true.
Many associate America's low standing with the presidency of George W.
Bush. The American public's satisfaction with the U.S. position in the world
fell from a high of 70 percent in 2002 to a low of 30 percent in 2008. Members
of the international community were of like mind. In 2008, only 31 percent of
Germans, 22 percent of Egyptians, 41 percent of Chinese, 19 percent of
Pakistanis, and 47 percent of Mexicans had a favorable opinion of the United
States. In 2009, however, favorability ratings of the United States increased
sharply in most parts of the world.
This improvement is widely hailed as a
result of an ‘Obama effect' -- the new president's approach coupled with the
idea that his mere election has improved America's global image. But scratch a
little bit below the surface and you will find a faultline that threatens the
Obama presidency. Standing goes beyond favorable opinion polls.
Consider, for
example, that even as respondents see the U.S. in a more positive light, there
are strong indications of continuing, deep global dissatisfaction with American
economic and military policies. Foreign opinion shows significant disapproval of
U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the lack of U.S. multilateralism, U.S. neglect of
others' interests, U.S. economic impact, and overall U.S. influence.
The
danger for Obama looms in the pressure between two tectonic plates. on the one
side are high expectations and optimism that Obama will address global
complaints about U.S. policy. on the other side, U.S. interests, domestic
politics, and the difficulty of global problems will prevent him from acting the
way others might like in many areas. The result could be a political earthquake
of reaction against America that sends the country's standing reeling
again.
Similar declines in standing have occurred before in U.S. history (for
example during the Vietnam war and early Reagan years) and by some measures
(e.g. the level of agreement with U.S. votes in the U.N. General Assembly) the
latest plunge in standing started before the Bush administration. It is worth
noting that the recent improvements in standing preceded Obama. Falling
favorability ratings in most countries bottomed in 2007 and then began to
improve.
"‘Standing' is too vague a term to
measure."
No. OK, "U.S.
standing" -- its position with respect to reputation, stature, or prestige in
world affairs -- is not as concrete or easily measured as say cruise missiles,
wheat bales, or Eurodollars. And there is much we do not understand about it.
But standing nonetheless captures a critical dimension of a country's reputation
that cannot be represented by measures of its material capabilities.
In
accounting terms, standing is like "goodwill" -- it reflects the intangible
assets of a country above and beyond its net tangible assets -- a kind of
reputation that makes it valuable among "clients." Standing offers long-term
political capital in international politics -- and as we will see, at home as
well.
Standing has two major facets: credibility and esteem. Credibility
refers to the U.S. government's ability to do what it says it is going to do --
to stand up for what it believes, and to stand against threats to its interests
and ideals. Esteem refers to America's stature, or what America is perceived to
stand for in the hearts and minds of foreign publics and policymakers.
Credibility and esteem can be mutually reinforcing, but they can also be
difficult to pursue in tandem -- a trade-off implied by Machiavelli's famous
dictum: "It is much safer to be feared than loved."
"Opposition to the U.S. is mainly based on its outsized
power."
Not even close.
U.S. standing has varied greatly around the world, despite constant U.S. primacy
over the past two decades. The decline in standing was uneven across different
world regions: very strong in the Middle East and Europe; strong in Latin
America and Southeast Asia; and, with some notable exceptions, less pronounced
in Africa and South and East Asia. The recent recovery in these opinion polls
has also been uneven, with the most significant improvements in Europe and the
Americas.
Regional interests mattered, and differed, across the regions. In
the Middle East, the professed U.S. policy of democratization since 2002
threatened authoritarian regimes; and perceived U.S. disengagement from the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict reinforced the view that the United States was
neither a fair nor an engaged arbiter in the conflict. In East Asia, the
continued availability of American markets for East Asian exports had a strong
effect on national prosperity, which enjoyed strong support among elites and the
public. In addition, many Europeans viewed the American turn toward
unilateralism and the doctrine of preemptive war as unraveling the multilateral
fabric of Europe's preferred international order. Obama's leadership style is
reassuring European publics without eliminating lingering suspicions that the
change may be one of style rather than substance.
American standing is also
influenced by the presence of a major regional power. Where such a power exists
and is hostile, as in Cold War Europe (Soviet Union), or potentially not
entirely benign, as in contemporary East Asia (China), American standing is
bolstered by fears that domination by the regional power would be even worse.
Even in the Middle East, Iran's regional aspirations give the United States some
strong support among the elites of Sunni states.
Not only does U.S. standing
vary across regions and countries, it also varies within countries between
elites and the public. An important predictor of U.S. standing among foreign
elites is whether U.S. policy is perceived to be helping or harming their
interests. The public, however, tends to focus on the justness and morality of
U.S. conduct. When foreign publics believe the United States is not playing by
the rules, is applying double standards, and is engaging in hypocrisy, U.S.
standing suffers. The legacy of Iranian hostility towards the United States has
roots in America's 1953 overthrow of populist leader Mohammed Mosaddeq and
support for the shah despite the U.S.'s professed adherence to the principles of
self-determination and liberal democracy.
"The U.S. model is losing out to its
competitors."
Not yet. There is no clear finding that U.S. relative
standing is suffering in terms of credibility or esteem based on the rise of
"competing" models of politics and policy offered by China, Europe, or Russia.
Polls in 2009 suggest recent declines in the relative attractiveness of these
actors. At the same time, the economic meltdown of 2008-09 has led to widespread
critiques of the U.S. economic model. A liberal Chinese economist bemoaned that
"the popular view is that the American model is failing." A Social Democrat in
Germany's parliament concluded, "[the U.S. model] has lost its attraction
entirely."
During the last four decades American standing has
sometimes seen major declines, but has typically bounced back because the
American model continued to have strong appeal (i.e., esteem). one indicator of
this is the continuing attractiveness of the U.S. higher education system and
the fact that many who come to study in the United States end up staying. U.S.
universities are being used for models and actively establishing programs in
places like Qatar, Singapore, and China.
That said, the potential for a
resurgence in America's current standing varies by region, and how America
responds to the global financial and economic crisis is especially important. If
the United States provides fewer global and regional public goods, such as
economic or military assistance, its standing will diminish in East Asia and
erode even further in Europe. Similarly, if growing U.S. budget deficits require
cuts in the recent expansion of American aid programs in Africa, this might also
erode American standing in a continent where trends have been more positive in
recent years.
"Partisanship stops at the water's
edge."
That was then.
There is today a substantial divergence of partisan views on U.S. standing in
the world. For Republicans, standing seems to evoke hard-power notions of
"resolve," which favor the credibility side of standing. Democrats appear to
emphasize ideas that highlight esteem, like "legitimacy" and "moral
standing."
This partisan gap is also apparent in public perceptions of U.S.
standing, which widened considerably during Bush's tenure. Partisan differences
over America's position in the world, however, predate the controversies of the
Bush presidency. And though the partisan gap has narrowed since mid-2008, it has
not disappeared, nor is it likely to. This is because where Democrats and
Republicans stand on American standing is shaped by which party controls the
presidency. For example, Democrats' satisfaction with U.S. standing was higher
under Clinton, and now that a Democrat is in the White House, it is on the rise
again. By contrast, Republican satisfaction rose when Bush assumed the
presidency, and it has fallen under Obama.
Significantly, this partisan
polarization has soared since the end of the Cold War. Partisan differences over
America's global position averaged by presidency indicate new highs under Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush. The average partisan gap of 18 percent in the
assessment of presidential performance across the Eisenhower, Johnson, and
Reagan administrations rose more than 50 percent, to an average 28 percent
difference. in the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies.
Partisan
difference, however, is not the whole story. Both Republicans and Democrats
believe that U.S. standing declined between 2002 and 2009. Dissatisfaction among
Democrats increased sharply during the first term of the Bush presidency;
Republican dissatisfaction surged during the second term, probably due to
growing doubts about the competence of the Bush administration. Such doubts, at
home and abroad, were likely affected by U.S. fortunes in Iraq that improved in
the wake of Bush's gutsy surge plan.
Overall, Americans are currently unhappy
with the country's low standing abroad. Public satisfaction with America's
standing has declined almost every year since 2002 and is now less than half its
peak level. Public confidence in how the rest of the world sees the United
States has followed a similar trajectory, declining from 75 percent who believed
that the United States had a positive international image before the September
11 terrorist attacks to just 45 percent today.
"Standing does not matter."
Dead wrong. During
the Cold War, the United States was anxious that its reputation for protecting
its allies, especially those in Europe, be seen as credible by both Soviet
leaders and Europeans. As Lyndon Johnson explained to Martin Luther King, Jr. in
early 1965, "If I pulled out [of Vietnam] ... I think the Germans would be
scared to death that our commitment to them was no good, and God knows what we'd
have in other places in the world."
More recently, the Bush Doctrine was
reversed in Bush's second term in part due to falling support abroad --
involving both credibility and esteem -- that made it harder for the United
States to get what it wanted.
Of course, many other factors affect
foreign-policy success and we should not delude ourselves that standing is the
critical factor. Moreover, standing should never be the sole consideration
behind U.S. foreign policy. There will inevitably be trade-offs between other
pressing interests in particular situations; for example, the United States may
need to act to protect itself from an imminent threat, and this action may
diminish its standing among some audiences.
It is important, however, to
acknowledge more explicitly the costs and benefits of maintaining standing in
policymaking. For decision makers under pressure, it is tempting to focus only
on what is concrete and immediate and has short-term impact. But just as it is
dangerous for business leaders to focus only on quarterly profits and ignore
their firm's long-term health, so too must U.S. leaders consider the nation's
stock of credibility and esteem.
U.S. standing affects other nations'
willingness to offer it the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, U.S. credibility and
esteem help to mold Americans' sense of unity and collective purpose. Standing
is easy to neglect, but wise policymakers should consider its impact and
sometimes protect it even when there are short-term costs.
Managing standing
requires using different tools for different jobs. Standing is a nuanced
phenomenon that varies across regions, between foreign elites and the publics,
and between partisans in the United States. Policymakers must attend to those
distinctions in specific ways. And the United States must heed the bond between
power and standing by providing public goods through effective leadership that
coordinates other states and shares costs.
Improving standing requires moving
beyond public diplomacy. The problem is not just communication, but policy
execution. As Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
recently put it, "Each time we fail to live up to our values or don't follow up
on a promise, we look more and more like the arrogant Americans the enemy claims
we are."
Finally we need better data and analysis on U.S. standing. The
United States supports periodic National Election Surveys at home; questions
about standing should be added to the survey and public funds for other
indicators -- such as foreign media analysis -- are needed.
The dynamics of
U.S. standing are complex, and we grasp only imperfectly the sources and impact
of U.S. credibility and esteem in the world. Yet standing matters for U.S.
foreign policy, and American leaders must pay attention to it or face real-world
consequences.